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Sexual Harassment: Preventive Steps for the
Healthcare Practitioner
Christine Godsil Cooper*
"A well-intentioned compliment can form the basis of a sexual
harassment cause of action."'
"The absence of notice [of sexual harassment] to an employer
does not necessarily insulate that employer from liability."2
I. INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment occurs in the healthcare industry. This is not
just common knowledge: it has been surveyed and it has been liti-
gated. Its incidence in university training programs3 and commu-
nity hospitals has been documented.4 Sexual harassment has been
the subject of lengthy litigation in a medical university setting, 5
and it is reported in a run-of-the-mill case about a doctor and a
nurse.6 Is there anything unique about sexual harassment in the
* Christine Godsil Cooper is a Professor of Law at Loyola University Chicago
School of Law. An arbitrator, she is co-chair of the Employee Rights and Responsibili-
ties Committee of the American Bar Association's Labor Law Section. She provides edu-
cation and training to management on all issues of employment law, including sexual
harassment, through the firm of Cooper, Berlin & Associates.
1. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991).
2. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
3. Miriam Komaromy et al., Sexual Harassment in Medical Training, 328 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 322 (1993).
4. Lynn Cavallo, Sexual Harassment of Nurses (1991) (unpublished research find-
ings, on file with the Institute for Health Law).
5. Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 759 F. Supp. 40 (D.P.R. 1991). This constitu-
tional and Title IX claim for sexual harassment and other discriminatory treatment by
male physicians wended its way through six court decisions, the first in 1983, and
culminated in post-trial motions in 1990. The plaintiff alleged that the chief surgical
resident instigated a "regime of terror" designed to drive all women from the surgical
residency program. Specific allegations of sexual harassment included persistent unwel-
come sexual advances, hostile behavior, Playboy centerfolds in the workplace, sexually
explicit drawing of the plaintiffs body, sexually charged nicknames, and graffiti trans-
lated as "she [plaintiff] swallows them." The jury returned a $525,000 verdict in favor of
the plaintiff. The court denied the university's motions for new trial or remittitur. How-
ever, the plaintiffs motion for reinstatement into the residency program was denied on
the grounds that the close working relationships among surgeons and the interests of the
patients made such equitable relief inappropriate.
6. Lara v. Cadag, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 811 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (plaintiffs failure to
present meaningful evidence of defendant's financial condition, such as a financial state-
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healthcare industry? Possibly, but the uniqueness, if it is that, lies
in the degree to which the healthcare industry is exposed to liabil-
ity for sexual harassment and for violating the rights of the harass-
ers. The healthcare industry must be prepared to confront the
usual panoply of civil rights actions 7 and related tort claims8 for
sexual harassment in the workplace, as well as Title IX claims
from harassed students.9 For the public healthcare employer, con-
stitutional claims may arise.10 When the healthcare institution dis-
ciplines a harasser, the institution must be prepared for exposure to
union grievances," breach of contract claims (including violations
ment, precluded an award of punitive damages; proof of only defendant's annual income
does not suffice).
7. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2002 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter Title VII], as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1071-1079 (Supp. III 1991) [hereinafter 1991 Civil Rights Amendments], is the most
common vehicle for attacking sexual harassment in the workplace. Claims may also be
brought under analogous state statutes prohibiting employment discrimination. See, e.g.,
Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/1-101 to 5/2-105 (1993). Plaintiffs seeking re-
dress under Title VII face procedural obstacles: the charge-filing period is short (charges
must be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") within
300 days of the occurrence of discrimination in deferral states, and suits must be insti-
tuted within 90 days of receipt of the right to sue letter from the EEOC), and the reme-
dies available under Title VII are limited, with compensatory and punitive damages
capped at $300,000 for the largest employers. Consequently, sexual harassment plaintiffs
often file tort claims as well.
8. See, e.g., Arnold v. United States, 816 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1987); Priest v. Rotary,
634 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (jury awarded $95,000 for claims of emotional dis-
tress, battery, and false imprisonment, plus $15,000 punitive damages); Rojo v. Kliger,
801 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1990) (discharge arising out of plaintiff's sexual harassment claim
constitutes tort of retaliatory discharge under California law). See also Lara v. Cadag, 16
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 812 ("plaintiff... assert[ed] the usual assortment of intentional tort
theories" for sexual harassment).
9. In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992), the Supreme
Court held that sexually harassed students can sue a school district for money damages
under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681-1688 (1988)
[hereinafter Title IX]. This decision clarified that harassed students could seek compen-
satory money damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. While there have been
few developments since the Gwinnett decision, courts often rely on developments in the
substantive law under Title VII to resolve sexual harassment issues in the educational
setting. Title IX also prohibits sex discrimination in employment by educational institu-
tions. See Paddio v. Board of Trustees for State Colleges & Univs., 61 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 86 (E.D. La. 1993).
10. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Borough of Avalon, 799 F. Supp. 442, 446 (D.N.J. 1992)
("plaintiffs may be able to show that the risk of sexual harassment occurring in the work-
place is obvious, and that the failure to inform employees of a policy against sexual har-
assment and to institute procedures for reporting and investigating such allegations
creates an extremely high risk that constitutional violations involving sexual harassment
will occur"); Murphy v. Chicago Transit Authority, 638 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Il. 1986)
(supervisors were liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to sexual har-
assment by co-workers).
11. The union may grieve the discharge as a violation of the just cause provision of
2
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 2 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol2/iss1/3
1993] Sexual Harassment: Preventive Steps
of tenure),' 2 discrimination claims,13 and tort claims such as inva-
sion of privacy, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, and retaliatory discharge.' 4
the collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., KIAM, 97 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 617
(1991) (discharge of love-struck harasser reduced to written warning). See generally,
Christine Godsil Cooper, Sexual Harassment in the Unionized Workplace. Litigation and
Arbitration, in SIXTH ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR ARBITRATION: Fo-
CUS ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT 1 (National Practice Institute 1992); Enterprise Wire Co.,
46 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 359 (1966) (delineating the industrial just cause requirements).
Courts will not enforce contracts that violate public policy and thus will set aside an
arbitration award that violates a clearly defined public policy. United Paperworkers Int'l
Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987). In two recent decisions, the courts found that
reinstatement of a harasser violated public policy. Stroehmann Bakeries v. Local 776,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir. 1992) (reinstatement of accused without
determination on the merits violates public policy against sexual harassment in the work-
place), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 660 (1992); Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical
Union, No. 915, 915 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1990) (reinstatement of recidivist sexual harasser
violates public policy against sexual harassment by perpetuating a hostile work environ-
ment and by inhibiting the employer's ability to perform its legal duty to prevent sexual
harassment). Accord Communication Workers v. Southeastern Elec. Coop., 882 F.2d 467
(10th Cir. 1989). Cf Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Allied Indus. Workers, 959 F.2d 685 (7th
Cir. 1992) (reinstatement of employee discharged for grabbing a co-worker's breasts and
commenting "Yup, they're real" upheld as within the arbitrator's remedial discretion).
12. Scherer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 975 F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1992) (Where a written
employment contract for a fixed duration gives the employer no discretion in termination,
an employee discharged for sexual harassment can assert a breach of contract claim if
there has been no actual misconduct; a good faith belief in the employee's misconduct
would not justify the firing. However, the court granted summary judgment to the em-
ployer, who produced evidence sufficient to show that plaintiff actually committed the
sexual harassment. The employer's thorough investigation produced ample evidence of
harassment, and the plaintiffs denials were equivocal.); Ross v. Robb, 662 S.W.2d 257
(Mo. 1983) (discharge of a tenured professor upheld under state anti-discrimination stat-
ute). See also Ashway v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 375 (D. Ariz.
1989) (Under Arizona law, failure to investigate allegations of sexual harassment prior to
discharge would breach implied-in-fact employment contract.), aft'd in part, rev'd in part
without opinion, 945 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1991) (text in Westlaw), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72
(1992).
13. Loyola Univ. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 500 N.E.2d 639 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
(discharge was racially discriminatory under state anti-discrimination statute where em-
ployer imposed harsher discipline on a black harasser than was imposed on nonblack
harassers). All harassers who are similarly situated (in terms of harassing conduct and
mitigating factors) must be treated similarly and not on the basis of race, age, sex, or
other prohibited category. See Lindsey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 962 F.2d 586 (7th
Cir. 1992) (sexual indiscretions, rather than age discrimination, motivated the discharge);
Johnson v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 815 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1987) (employee over forty
was terminated for kissing a sixteen-year-old waitress on the back of the head; the firing
was either for "good cause" or "based on reasonable factors other than age," both of
which are statutory defenses under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988)).
14. Garziano v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1987) (After
the harasser's discharge and in response to plant rumors and confusion about the nature
of prohibited harassment, the employer distributed a newsletter to employees noting that
"a serious act of employee misconduct [occurred] ... but . . .cannot be discussed in
3
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A thorough, extensive, and good faith investigation prior to dis-
ciplinary action may protect the employer from claims for wrong-
ful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 5
Disclosure of investigatory information on a "need to know" only
basis may save the employer from invasion of privacy and defama-
tion claims. 16 By imposing discipline that is appropriate to the
"crime," an employer may prevail in an arbitration. Actual har-
assment may be required before an employer can discharge an em-
ployee protected by a fixed-term, written employment contract.' 7
For the healthcare attorney, prevention is the key to minimizing
liability for sexual harassment and corporate responses to it.
While the healthcare attorney can take several important steps
to protect the client, the healthcare environment may present spe-
cial problems. According to conventional wisdom, the medical
profession is rigidly hierarchical and resistant to any change de-
manded by outsiders. These characteristics, if true, leave certain
dangers that the healthcare attorney must strive to counteract.
First, because the essence of sexual harassment is sexual subordina-
tion, 18 any organization that justifies and perpetuates hierarchy
will be more likely to engage in sexual harassment. Second, courts,
often influenced by non-medical experts who have testified in cases
of sexual harassment, 9 may demand sweeping changes in the es-
detail. However, deliberate, repeated, and unsolicited physical contact as well as signifi-
cant verbal abuse was involved in this case." Id. at 384. The terminated employee then
sued for libel and slander. The case was remanded for a determination of whether the
publication was excessive (thereby destroying the qualified privilege to defame) in light of
the employer's duty to eradicate and prevent sexual harassment.). See also Scherer v.
Rockwell Int'l, 766 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (qualified privilege to invade privacy
applies to investigations of suspicious employee conduct), affd, 975 F.2d 356 (7th Cir.
1992); Lovelace v. Long John Silver's, Inc., 841 S.W.2d 682 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (intra-
corporate immunity for defamation and derivative claim for loss of consortium); Carlson
v. Crater Lake Lumber Co., 796 P.2d 1216 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (discharge for resistance
to sexual harassment constitutes tort of retaliatory discharge). Common law tort claims
for co-worker harassment are often barred by the exclusivity provision of state workers'
compensation acts. See Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 957 F.2d 317
(7th Cir. 1992).
15. Johnson v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1651 (D.S.D. 1986).
16. See Garziano, 818 F.2d 380; Scherer, 766 F. Supp. 593.
17. Scherer, 975 F.2d 356.
18. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN
(1979); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987). Although sexual
subordination is usually involved in sexual harassment, it must be noted that men can
be-and are-sexually harassed by both men and women.
19. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); Robinson v. Jacksonville Ship-
yards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991), appeal docketed, No. 91-3655 (1 1th Cir.,
argued Dec. 2. 1992). See also Snider v. Consolidation Coal, 973 F.2d 555 (7th Cir.
4
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tablished order. The medical profession, like any organization that
insists upon self-regulation, may prove resistant to judicial com-
mands based upon the conclusions of non-medical experts.
The healthcare attorney's preventive work, however, is a finan-
cial necessity. Sexual harassment claimants can obtain huge judg-
ments: a Florida actress was awarded $1.4 million;2" a California
jury awarded over $1 million to a male harassed by his female su-
pervisor for a five-year period;2 a Kansas woman obtained a
$710,000verdict.22 Although the 1991 Civil Rights Amendments
cap compensatory and punitive damages at $300,000 for the largest
employers,23 these caps do not apply to the tort claims that are
often appended to the federal statutory claims or brought sepa-
rately in state court. These caps apply to each individual plaintiff;
thus, a class action suit could cost an employer millions of dol-
lars. 24 Moreover, these caps do not apply to backpay awards or to
attorneys' fees. There is no explicit cap on damages under Title
Ix.
There is a certain irony in the emphasis on damage awards:
most harassed women want nothing more than to have the harass-
ment stopped. Women satisfied with corrective action often do not
pursue monetary relief. This fact should encourage the healthcare
attorney to enact appropriate policies and procedures to eliminate
harassment. It should also inspire the attorney to consider creative
1992); Stockett v. Tolin, 791 F. Supp. 1536 (S.D. Fla. 1992); KIAM, 97 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 617 (1991).
20. Stockett v. Tolin, 791 F. Supp. 1536 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (upholding a verdict in
favor of plaintiff against the wealthy owner of an entertainment business for claims under
Title VII, battery, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
false imprisonment).
21. Gutierrez v. California Acrylic Indus., No. BC 055641 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1991),
summarized in 97 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-17 (May 21, 1993). In this action brought
under state law, the harasser was held individually liable for $10,000. The harassment
consisted of repeated coerced embraces and kisses, one instance of fondling of genitals,
and threats of adverse job actions, which were ultimately implemented. Complaints to
higher officials were ignored.
22. Laughinghouse v. Risser, 786 F. Supp. 920 (D. Kan. 1992) (eighteen-month pe-
riod of sexual harassment caused the plaintiff life-threatening injury).
23. These caps for compensatory and punitive damages are based on the employer's
number of "employees" as follows: for more than 500 employees, the cap is $300,000;
201-500 employees, $200,000; 101-200 employees, $100,000; and 15-100 employees,
$50,000. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (Supp. III 1991).
24. In Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1252 (D.
Minn. 1993), the plaintiffs won a class action lawsuit against a Minnesota mining com-
pany where sexist graffiti, photos, cartoons, and language pervaded the workplace. If the
caps are applied retroactively, the damage award to the approximately 200 women could
reach $30 million.
19931
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relief and alternatives to litigation."
This article will begin with the fundamentals of the definition of
sexual harassment. It will then discuss some special problems the
definition evokes: (1) the "reasonable woman" standard, (2) the
risks of real or apparent consensual sex in the workplace, and (3)
the silent or nonreporting target 26 of harassment. These definitions
and problems must be understood before the attorney can draft an
appropriate sexual harassment policy or make a determination,
when conducting an internal investigation, of whether or not sex-
ual harassment has occurred. Finally, the critical features of an
effective sexual harassment policy will be detailed.
II. SEXUAL HARASSMENT: WHAT IS IT? WHEN (AND WHY)
IS IT SEX DISCRIMINATION?
What is sexual harassment? To paraphrase the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") Guidelines' 27 definition
of sexual harassment, a definition that was accepted by the
Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson:21 Sexual har-
assment is unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature where (1) submis-
sion to or rejection of such conduct is used as a basis for making
employment decisions ("quid pro quo harassment"), or (2) such
conduct is so "severe or pervasive" that it alters conditions of em-
ployment and "creates an abusive working environment" ("hostile
environment harassment"). 29
The two different categories of harassment, quid pro quo and
hostile environment, are usually distinguished in terms of the types
of employer liability they create. Courts adopt varying approaches
to the issue of employer liability, but in general an employer may
be held financially liable for sexual harassment in the following sit-
uations: (1) if a supervisor or other agent of the employer commits
quid pro quo harassment;30 (2) if any employee, whether supervisor
25. See, e.g., Susan R. Meredith, Using Fact Finders to Probe Workplace Claims of
Sexual Harassment, ARB. J., Dec. 1992, at 61. See also ITT Consumer Financial Corp. v.
Wilson, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 509 (S.D. Miss. 1991) (arbitration of sexual
harassment claim compelled pursuant to employment contract arbitration clause).
26. I prefer to refer to the harassed employee as a "target" and not as a "victim."
The term "victim" connotes helplessness, an attribute that harms women.
27. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1992).
28. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Although the Court accepted
the EEOC Guidelines' definition of sexual harassment, it did not accept the EEOC's
broad imposition of liability on employers for all supervisory harassment.
29. Id. at 65.
30. Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989); Steele v.
Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311 (1 lth Cir. 1989) (employer automatically lia-
[Vol. 2
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or co-worker, creates a hostile working environment, and the em-
ployer knew or should have known about it and failed to take ap-
propriate remedial action;31 or (3) when a client, customer, or
stranger harasses an employee and the employer can control the
situation. 32 This third category would apply to the harassment of
employees by physicians who are independent contractors with the
hospital. If a hospital has knowledge, whether actual or imputed,
of sexual harassment by independent contractors, it must take rea-
sonable steps to prevent and remedy the harassment.
Knowledge of a hostile working environment can be imputed to
the employer when (1) the abusive environment is so noticeable
that management should have seen it and eradicated it, regardless
of whether or not a complaint was filed;3 3 (2) a complaint, formal
or otherwise, from the target or someone else is lodged with a su-
pervisor 34 or made pursuant to a formal complaint procedure; 35 or
ble for supervisor's quid pro quo harassment); Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Management
Co., 805 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1986) (knowledge of employment decision imputed to em-
ployer); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983) (automatic liability for supervisor's
quid pro quo harassment). See EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, reprinted
in 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 405:6681, 405:6694 (Mar. 19, 1990) and reproduced
in BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOY-
MENT LAW 661 (1992). See also cases cited in LINDEMANN & KADUE, id. at 221 n.9.
31. In Kauffman v, Allied Signal, Inc., Autolite Div., 970 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1992),
the Sixth Circuit discussed liability standards for hostile environment harassment. First,
where a supervisor creates the hostile environment, traditional agency principles rather
than the law of strict liability are used to establish liability. Second, even if a supervisor
creates a hostile working environment, "agency liability ... can be negated if the em-
ployer responds adequately and effectively once it has notice of the actions." Id. at 174.
Third, where a co-worker creates a hostile environment, respondeat superior establishes
liability; this is the "knew or should have known" standard. See also Ellison v. Brady,
924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1991); Dias v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 919 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1990).
See also LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 30, at 226-252.
32. EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (employer's insis-
tence that employees wear a sexually provocative uniform caused harassment by stran-
gers); EEOC Dec. 84-3, reprinted in 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1887 (1984) (Where
the employer had a friendly relationship with the harasser, a regular and frequent cus-
tomer, the employer should have told the harasser not to engage in further offensive
conduct toward the waitress.).
33. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991),
appeal docketed, No. 91-3655 (11th Cir., argued Dec. 2, 1992); Hansel v. Public Serv.
Co., 778 F. Supp. 1126, 1133 (D. Colo. 1991) (Because the very nature of sexual harass-
ment inhibits its targets from complaining, an employer "simply cannot sit back and wait
for complaints." Title VII imposes an "affirmative duty to seek out and eradicate a hos-
tile work environment .... In this case [of pervasive pornography and hostile graffiti
directed toward plaintiff,] the writing was literally on the walls.").
34. The employer in Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987) was held
liable for supervisory harassment even though informal notice of the harassment was
given by a co-worker years earlier. However, in Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communi-
cations, Inc., 957 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1992), a supervisor's knowledge of the complaint and
of the harasser's proclivities was not imputed to the employer because the supervisor had
7
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(3) when the employer does not have an effective sexual harass-
ment policy in place. 36
A complaint not only charges management with knowledge of
the situation, it also triggers an obligation to investigate and take
appropriate corrective action.37 An appropriate investigation may
be one that considers whether systemic problems exist and whether
existing complaint procedures are adequate.38 When the employer
conducts a prompt investigation and undertakes appropriate cor-
rective action designed to end the harassment, the employer will
not be liable.39 An inadequate response to the situation, however,
will result in employer liability.40 A corporation that does not have
an effective complaint procedure in place will be deemed to have
ignored, tolerated, or condoned the harassment.
The clearest example of quid pro quo harassment is "put out or
get out." In the typical quid pro quo case, the target has lost a job
benefit: the target has either been terminated or not promoted be-
cause the sexual advances of a supervisor have been refused. In the
less typical quid pro quo case, where the target submits to the su-
pervisor's sexual advances and is therefore retained or promoted, it
is unlikely that the target will admit receiving a job benefit as a
result of complying with a supervisor's sexual demands. Indeed,
this scenario is most often categorized as a hostile working envi-
ronment, with the target claiming that sexual favors were part of
no supervisory authority over the harasser, had no duty to report claims of sexual harass-
ment, and had no involvement with the human resources department. "Knowledge of an
agent is imputed to her corporate principal only if the agent receives the knowledge while
acting within the scope of her authority and the knowledge concerns a matter within the
scope of that authority." Id. at 321 (emphasis in original). See also Canada v. Boyd
Group, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 771 (D. Nev. 1992) (employer's knowledge of hostile working
environment was shown by complaint to officials as well as by manager's earlier concern
about the "professional conduct of accused").
35. Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1990); Hirschfeld v. New
Mexico Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1990); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842
F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988).
36. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (employer's policy was inef-
fective because it was unclear and because it required the target employee to complain to
the harasser).
37. Risinger v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation, 883 F.2d 475, 481-83 (6th
Cir. 1989); Yates, 819 F.2d 630, 636.
38. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1252 (D. Minn.
1993).
39. Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987).
40. Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983); Martin v. Norbar, Inc., 537 F. Supp.
1260 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (employer's motion for summary judgment denied because the
court deemed the employer's failure to reassign a truck after a single, uncorroborated
complaint by his co-driver to be an insufficient response to the complaint).
41. EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, supra note 30.
[Vol. 2
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the job description rather than the basis for an employment
decision.42
Where hostile working environment harassment occurs, it is not
necessary for the target to suffer a tangible loss of position, wages,
or other economic benefit. However, it is necessary that the har-
assment "be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions
of [the target's] employment and create an abusive working
environment.' 43
The Supreme Court has agreed to hear a case in which the issue
is whether or not the target in a hostile environment case must
prove serious psychological harm in order to prevail, or whether
the harassment itself entitles the target to relief.44 While the case
may prove significant, it is unlikely to deter the most serious and
costly of claims, for these often cause serious psychological harm.
The hostile environment claim can be difficult to decide, whether
the decision is made by a court or pursuant to a corporate investi-
gation. "Severe or pervasive" harassment cannot be mechanically
defined, although it has been established that the more severe the
42. Meritor, 477 U.S. 57.
43. Id. at 67.
44. Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 240 (M.D. Tenn.
1991), affid without opinion, 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 1382
(Mar. 1, 1993) (No. 92-1168). The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs complaint of con-
structive discharge arising from a hostile working environment, stating:
I believe that Hardy is a vulgar man and demeans the female employees at his
work place. Many clerical employees tolerate his behavior .... This does not
mean, however, that plaintiff, a managerial employee, took it the same way. In
fact, I believe she did not. She believed that Hardy's sexual comments under-
mined her authority; this was especially painful when Hardy would make
demeaning sexual comments to plaintiff in front of coworkers.
Id. at 248. Nonetheless, the court held that the conduct, while offensive to a reasonable
woman, did not violate Title VII because it did not "seriously affect plaintiffs psychologi-
cal well-being." Id. at 249. This Sixth Circuit approach, first set forth in Rabidue v.
Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (1986), accords with that of the Seventh and the
Eleventh Circuits. See Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 418-20 (7th Cir. 1989);
Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1561 (11th Cir. 1987). The more
liberal standard of the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits allows recovery where the con-
duct would have offended a reasonable victim, regardless of psychological harm. See
Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990); Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus.,
Inc., 955 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1992); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991).
Amicus briefs on behalf of the target in Harris were filed by the EEOC, the American
Medical Women's Association, the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Amer-
ican Jewish Committee, the National Conference of Women's Bar Associations, the
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, the National Council of Jewish Women,
and numerous other groups. Available in LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file. The Ameri-
can Psychological Association filed a brief on behalf of "Neither Party," but it reads as a
brief to support plaintiff. Available in LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file.
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conduct, the less pervasive it need be.45 What must be evaluated
are the consequences that the harassing conduct had on the work-
place environment.46 Any judgment made must be based on the
totality of the circumstances.47 Courts typically find that a hostile
environment exists only where the fact situation is egregious, either
in duration or intensity. Examples of conduct that creates a hostile
working environment include feigning masturbation to express an-
ger,4 daily comments and sexual advances by supervisors,49 touch-
ing private body parts, 0 pervasive pornography, and sexist slurs."
One claim for sexual harassment involved sexual comments and
compliments, jokes, looks, shoulder-touching, and leaning against
or rubbing the target.52 The hostile working environment can con-
sist of sexual events that might not constitute a hostile environ-
ment in and of themselves, but that are unlawful when combined
with either racial harassment or nonsexual physical abuse. 3 Evi-
dence of harassment directed toward other women is relevant to
hostile working environment.5 4 By contrast, a small amount of
sexual joking and compliments usually will not result in a judicial
finding that the working environment is hostile. 55
Regardless of whether the harassment is quid pro quo or results
45. Carrero v. New York Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989); EEOC Policy
Guidance on Sexual Harassment, supra note 30.
46. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880.
47. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991),
appeal docketed, No. 91-3655 (11th Cir., argued Dec. 2, 1992).
48. Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1992).
49. Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777 (1st Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Gurnee
Inn Corp., 914 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1990); Dias v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 919 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir.
1990).
50. See Jones v. Wesco Invs., Inc., 846 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1988).
51. Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990).
52. Canada v. Boyd Group, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 771 (D. Nev. 1992) (denying em-
ployer's motion for summary judgment on employee claim of hostile working
environment).
53. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1485-86; Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir.
1989) (court found that the repeated presentation, even after warning, of pornographic
pictures depicting black women in submissive poses of sodomy, with the comments
"That's what you're hired for" and "That's the talent of a black woman," created a
hostile working environment); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir.
1987).
54. Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988).
55. Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1993) (Requests for
dates, joking references to plaintiff as a "dumb blond," attempted kisses, shoulder-touch-
ings, and placing "I love you" signs in plaintiff's work area did not constitute a hostile
working environment because the incidents were "relatively isolated" and not serious.)
Accord Saxton v. AT&T, 785 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Ill. 1992). See also Hallquist v. Plumb-
ers Local 276, 843 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1988); Jackson-Colley v. Department Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 655 F. Supp. 122 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (supervisor's bad habit of scratching his
10
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from hostile working environment, the sexual conduct must be
"unwelcome" to constitute unlawful sexual harassment.56 Invited
sexual attention is not sexual harassment. Courts may consider the
speech and dress of the target in determining whether the sexual
attention was welcome. 57 Obviously, if the target pursues the al-
leged harasser, the claim will fail.58 However, this evidence must
relate to the interaction between the complaining party and the
alleged harasser, not to the complaining party's general attitude
toward sexual behavior. 9
The "unwelcomeness" aspect of a sexual harassment case
presents difficult problems of proof and may depend upon determi-
nations of credibility.60 The trier of fact (which, pursuant to the
1991 Civil Rights Amendments, may be a jury) must look to "the
record as a whole" and "the totality of the circumstances" to de-
termine whether sexual harassment occurred. 61 These same deter-
minations must be made by the employer following an internal
investigation of sexual harassment.
It is important not to confuse the term "welcome" with the term
"voluntary." The two are different concepts. In Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, the complainant's sexual relationship with the ac-
groin in public did not constitute sexual harassment); EEOC Dec. 82-2, reprinted in 28
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1843 (1982).
56. In order to distinguish harassment from consensual office romances, it has been
argued that "welcome" applies only to quid pro quo cases. Amicus Brief for Women's
Legal Defense Fund et al., Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., No. 92-1168, available in
LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file.
57. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
58. EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, supra note 30 (citing a case where
the plaintiff lost because she behaved in a flirtatious and provocative manner, inviting the
man to have dinner at her house several times).
59. Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 963 (8th Cir. 1993) ("The
plaintiff's choice to pose for a nude [motorcycle] magazine outside work hours is not
material to the issue of whether plaintiff found her employer's work-related conduct of-
fensive. This is not a case where Burns posed in provocative and suggestive ways at
work. Her private life, regardless of how reprehensible the trier of fact might find it to be,
did not provide lawful acquiescence to unwanted sexual advances at her work place by
her employer. To hold otherwise would be contrary to Title VII's goal of ridding the
work place of any kind of unwelcome sexual harassment.") See also Swentek v. USAir,
Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987) ("Plaintiffs use of foul language or sexual innu-
endo in a consensual setting does not waive 'her legal protections against unwelcome
harassment.' ") (quoting Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 n.3 (4th Cir. 1983)); Weiss v.
Amoco Oil Co., 142 F.R.D. 311 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (accused can discover information
concerning past sexual conduct with co-workers that was known to accused, as this infor-
mation is relevant to issue of offensiveness); Thoreson v. Penthouse Int'l, 606 N.E.2d
1369 (N.Y. 1992) (a woman who worked in the sex industry obtained a $60,000 judgment
against Bob Guccione); EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, supra note 30.
60. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
61. Id. at 69 (quoting the EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1980)).
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cused spanned nearly three years, during which time they had in-
tercourse approximately fifty times. The fact that the intercourse
was voluntary-in the sense that it was not rape-did not defeat
the plaintiff's claim for sexual harassment. Where submission to
sexual advances is, in effect, part of the job description, sexual har-
assment exists. "Welcome" means that the target really wanted to
engage in sexual contact; "voluntary" can mean that the target felt
the job demanded sexual contact.
III. WHEN IS SEXUAL HARASSMENT SEXUAL
DISCRIMINATION?
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act does not explicitly outlaw
sexual harassment; instead, it prohibits discrimination on the basis
of sex. Sex-based discrimination must be proved in a statutory
claim of sexual harassment under Title VII.62
Earlier, courts rejected claims that sexual harassment in the
workplace constituted sex discrimination. Judges refused to be-
lieve that sexual harassment was "based on sex." Rather, the con-
duct, while recognized as obnoxious, was considered merely "a
personal proclivity" of the perpetrator and not a form of sex dis-
crimination.63 By 1977, however, courts recognized that sexual
harassment occurred because of the sex of the target and that sex-
ual harassment therefore constituted discrimination on the basis of
sex. Imposing a condition of employment on one sex (a woman)
when the same condition is not imposed on the other sex (usually a
man) is sex discrimination. 64
A plaintiff can prove that sexual harassment constitutes sex dis-
crimination in one of several ways: (1) sexual behavior directed
toward another person, male or female, is, by its nature, conduct
motivated on the basis of the target's sex and raises the inference
that harassment is on the basis of sex;65 (2) harassing behavior,
whether sexual or not, that is based on animosity toward women is
62. Such proof may not be needed under state statutes that independently outlaw
sexual harassment. See, e.g., Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/1-102 (1992).
63. Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (granting
defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint), vac'd without opinion, 562 F.2d 55
(9th Cir. 1977).
64. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'g Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C. 1974) (in which the court had granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
65. Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900 (1 1th Cir. 1988); Hansel
v. Public Serv. Co., 778 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Colo. 1991) (etiology of sexual harassment is
"pure gender bias").
[Vol. 2
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discrimination on the basis of sex;6 6 or (3) conduct that is dispro-
portionately demeaning to or more offensive to one sex is harass-
ment on the basis of sex. Such conduct creates an artificial barrier
to full employment opportunities.
Most plaintiffs are able to show that the sexual harassment con-
stitutes sex discrimination using the inference that the sex of the
target caused the conduct. Since all discrimination on the basis of
sex is prohibited, it is irrelevant whether the perpetrator is male or
female or whether the target is male or female.68 Although homo-
sexuality is not a category protected from discrimination by Title
VII,69 homosexual advances, like heterosexual advances, occur be-
cause of the sex of the target. Thus, all sexual harassment, whether
heterosexual or homosexual, is prohibited.
Sometimes the sex of the target is not what caused the harass-
ment. For example, the reason for the disfavored treatment may
be something other than sex. In one case the court found that sex-
ual harassment occurred not because the plaintiff was a man, but
because he had jilted his female supervisor, his former lover; he
could not prove that the harassment was on the basis of sex.7°
Occasionally, an employee who is not promoted will bring a
charge of harassment based on sexual favoritism: the non-
promoted person claims injury because some other person received
a job benefit for granting sexual favors. Such claims meet with
limited success. Isolated (in contrast to widespread) sexual favorit-
ism is usually not considered sexual harassment because the per-
sonal relationship, rather than sexual harassment, accounted for
the promotion or other job benefit. 71 However, pervasive sexual
66. Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990); Lipsett v. University of
Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th
Cir. 1988); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987); McKinney v.
Dole, 765 F.2d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
In an Illinois case decided under the state statute, the court approved a rule that di-
vided "dirty words" into those that are gender-neutral (e.g., "fuck" and "motherfucker")
and those that are gender-specific and used to express animosity toward women ("cunt,"
"bitch," "twat," and "raggin' it"). These words, together with other specific incidents,
constituted unlawful sexual harassment. Illinois v. Human Rights Comm'n, 534 N.E.2d
161, 170-71 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
67. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522-23 (M.D. Fla.
1991), appeal docketed, No. 91-3655 (11th Cir., argued Dec. 2, 1992).
68. See, e.g., Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186 (1st Cir. 1990).
69. DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979).
70. Huebschen v. Department of Health & Social Servs., 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir.
1983). See also Murray v. Wal-Mart Stores, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 850 (D.
Kan. 1993) (no actionable harassment for animosity toward a particular woman and not
toward women in general).
71. DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Ctr., 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986)
1993]
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favoritism would constitute sexual harassment because the message
sent by the employer is that sexual favors are required for
promotions. 7 2
IV. SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT
DETERMINATIONS
Three specific issues in sexual harassment law must be recog-
nized by any organization hoping to prevent and remedy sexual
harassment: (1) in cases where the target is a woman, the reason-
able woman standard, (2) the risks of consensual sex in the work-
place, and (3) the consequences of a target's failure to report sexual
harassment. Each of these issues should be addressed by every or-
ganization, either in its formulation of a sexual harassment policy
or in its internal strategies for dealing with sexual harassment
complaints.
A. The Reasonable Woman Standard
In hostile environment cases, some courts ask whether a reason-
able person in the position of the target would find the working
environment abusive; some also insist that the target actually
found the environment to be abusive. 73 A recent, well-publicized
trend is to ask: "What would a reasonable woman experience?" 74
(When the boss wrote a new job description in order to promote his paramour, the non-
promoted men sued for sexual harassment. The court found no causal connection be-
tween the gender of the men denied the promotion and the resultant preference for the
female lover. In other words, it was not the sex of the men that caused the employment
decision, it was the personal relationship with the woman.). Accord, EEOC Policy Gui-
dance on Employer Liability for Sexual Favoritism, reprinted in 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Man-
ual 405:6817 (Feb. 15, 1990) (isolated instances of favoritism do not violate Title VII
because all nonparamours are disadvantaged for reasons other than their gender).
72. Favoritism based upon coerced sexual conduct may corfstitute quid pro quo har-
assment, and widespread favoritism may constitute hostile environment harassment.
EEOC Policy Guidance on Employer Liability for Sexual Favoritism, supra note 71. Ac-
cord, Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853 (3d Cir'. 1990) (essence of plain-
tiff's claim is that the sexual affairs of other workers "prevented [plaintiff] from working
in an environment in which she could be evaluated on grounds other than her sexuality").
See also Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C. 1988) (The conduct of supervi-
sors at the Securities and Exchange Commission was to bestow preferential treatment
upon those who submitted to their sexual advances; this undermined the plaintiff's moti-
vation and work performance and deprived her and other female employees of promo-
tions and job opportunities.).
73. Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 1504 (7th Cir. 1989); Rabidue v. Osceola
Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
74. Burns v. McGregor Electronic Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 962 n.3 (8th Cir. 1993);
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469
(3d Cir. 1990); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987); Robinson v. Jackson-
ville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991), appeal docketed, No. 91-3655
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Would a reasonable woman consider the conduct so severe or per-
vasive as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abu-
sive working environment?75
The justification for utilizing the reasonable woman standard
when a woman is the target is that women and men are differently
situated when it comes to conduct of a sexual nature. 6 Women
view sexual conduct differently than men: where women see coer-
cion in sexual attention, men see compliment.77 Women, being
more vulnerable to sexual aggression and violence, are more likely
to see sexual advances as threatening and demeaning.78 Women
are generally more careful of and vigilant about sexual activity
than are men.79
The rationale behind the reasonable woman standard is best il-
lustrated by Ellison v. Brady,80 a case involving perceived sexual
aggression, and Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,81 a por-
nography case.
In Ellison, the target employee was pestered by Gray, her co-
(11th Cir., argued Dec. 2, 1992); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 61 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1252 (D. Minn. 1993); Canada v. Boyd Group, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 771 (D.
Nev. 1992).
75. "It is the harasser's conduct which must be pervasive or severe, not the alteration
in the conditions of employment." Ellison, 924 F.2d at 877.
76. The reasonable woman standard is not without its critics, however. At least two
amicus briefs in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., No. 92-1168 (1993), took the position
that the reasonable woman standard is inappropriate because it perpetuates discrimina-
tory conditions and stereotypes by incorporating the views of the harassers, and it ac-
cepts, as the trial court did, that many women have been "conditioned to accept
denigrating treatment." Amicus Brief of Women's Legal Defense Fund et al., available
in LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file. The standard "forces plaintiffs to prove that dis-
crimination at work is worse than discrimination in society." Moreover, it invites an
intrusive inquiry into the plaintiff's past sexual history. Amicus Brief of NOW Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Catharine A. MacKinnon, The American Jewish Commit-
tee, American Medical Women's Association et al., available in LEXIS, Genfed library,
Briefs file. The Women's Legal Defense Fund filed an amicus brief in the appeal of
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., calling for a "reasonable person" standard or for
"a standard that credits a plaintiff's credible allegations of adverse change in her employ-
ment condition." Available in LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file.
77. The Robinson court noted that sexual advances in the workplace are perceived as
compliments by most men (66 2/3%) and as insults by only 15% of the men. For wo-
men, the numbers are reversed: -2/3 of women are insulted by sexual advances in the
workplace and 15% are flattered. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1505.
78. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
79. See generally, MARY BATTEN, SEXUAL STRATEGIES: How FEMALES CHOOSE
THEIR MATES (1992); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992); DOROTHY DIN-
NERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR: SEXUAL ARRANGEMENTS AND
HUMAN MALAISE (1976).
80. 924 F.2d 872.
81. 760 F. Supp. 1486.
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worker at the Internal Revenue Service. Despite a request to cease
his attentions, Gray wrote Ellison a three page letter with such
comments as "I know that you are worth knowing with or without
sex," and describing how he was "experiencing you from 0 so far
away." Ellison, fearing that Gray was "crazy," complained to her
supervisor. Gray was transferred to another office, but after the
union grieved the transfer, he was allowed to return six months
later with only an instruction to leave Ellison alone. Ellison was
not consulted about this resolution. When she realized that Gray
had returned, she filed a charge with the EEOC. The EEOC deter-
mined that the employer had adequately addressed the plaintiff's
complaints; 82 the district court granted summary judgment to the
employer, reasoning that Gray's conduct was "isolated and genu-
inely trivial." 3
The appellate court disagreed, sent the case to trial, and promul-
gated and explained the reasonable woman standard:
[W]e hold that a female plaintiff states a prima facie case of hos-
tile environment sexual harassment when she alleges conduct
which a reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an
abusive working environment.84
If we only examined whether a reasonable person would engage
in allegedly harassing conduct, we would run the risk of reinforc-
ing the prevailing level of discrimination. Harassers could con-
tinue to harass merely because a particular discriminatory
practice was common, and victims of harassment would have no
remedy. 85
The court acknowledged that one possible result of its new stan-
dard is that unlawful sexual harassment could occur without the
perpetrator realizing that the conduct was wrong. However, as the
court noted, "Title VII is not a fault-based tort scheme."'8 6 It is
aimed at discriminatory consequences, not motivation.
In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,8" a federal district
court in Florida adopted the perspective of the reasonable woman
82. 924 F.2d at 875.
83. Id. at 876.
84. Id. at 879.
85. Id. at 878. The appellate court considered the question of whether the conduct
was severe or pervasive enough to constitute an abusive environment as a question of law,
with de novo review. Id. at 876.
86. Id. at 880.
87. 760 F.2d 1486.
[Vol. 2
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as well as the feminist perspective8 that views workplace pornog-
raphy as creating an abusive working environment for women. At
the Jacksonville Shipyards, where fewer than five percent of the
craftworkers were women, the hostile working environment was
created by posters, centerfolds, and vendor advertising calendars.
The pictures depicted naked women "in sexually suggestive or sub-
missive poses." Included among the various poses were breasts
and labia, a nude female torso with the words "USDA Choice," a
woman's pubic area pressed with a meat spatula, and a dart board
drawing of a woman's breast with her nipple as the bull's eye. The
pictorial display was accompanied by language directed to the fe-
males: "Hey pussycat, come here and give me a whiff"; "The more
you lick it, the harder it gets"; and so on. Graffiti included "lick
me you whore dog bitch." In addition to the pictorial environ-
ment, some of the women employees were pinched on the breasts
by their male co-workers.
In order to determine what effect this environment would have
on a reasonable woman, the court, which was presided over by a
male judge interested in the experiences of women,89 heard expert
testimony. One expert, psychologist Dr. Susan Fiske, had a
profound influence on the court's decision; the opinion includes an
extensive description of her findings. With the increasing use of
experts in sexual harassment cases, Dr. Fiske's testimony is worth
covering in detail.
Dr. Fiske described four preconditions that enhance workplace
stereotyping and the resulting discrimination: (1) the rarity of
women in the workplace, (2) the priming of stereotypic thinking by
sexual stimuli, (3) the male-dominated power structure of the
workplace, and (4) the atmosphere of a sexualized workplace.90
Rarity occurs when a disfavored group (here, women) consti-
tutes less than fifteen to twenty percent of the workforce. The con-
sequence of rarity is that these "solos" elicit extreme responses
from the majority group: for instance, "mildly substandard work
performance or workplace behavior is perceived as much worse."91
Sexual stimuli in the workplace promotes stereotypic thinking.
Pornography, sexual joking, and sexist slurs cause the men in the
88. Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAN. L. REV. 1183, 1212 n. 118 (1989), cited in Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at
1526.
89. "[T]he Court risks injustice if it attempts to fashion a reasonable woman's reac-
tion out of whole cloth." 760 F. Supp. at 1507 n.4.
90. Id. at 1503.
91. Id.
1993]
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workforce "to view and interact with women coworkers as if those
women are sex objects."' 92 Dr. Fiske described a study in which
college men were divided into two groups, one that viewed non-
violent pornography and one that viewed nonviolent films that
were not pornographic. When the men were subsequently asked to
describe a woman who had interviewed them shortly after the
films, "the males who viewed the pornographic film remembered
little about the female interviewer other than her physical attrib-
utes. The males who viewed the neutral film remembered the con-
tents of the interview. '9 3 In general,
to categorize a female employee along the lines of sex produces
an evaluation of her suitability as a "woman" who might be ex-
pected to be sexy, affectionate and attractive; this female em-
ployee would be evaluated less favorably if she is seen as not
conforming to that model without regard for her job
performance. 94
This unfavorable evaluation seemed to occur in the Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. case: several witnesses disapproved of
Robinson, the plaintiff, because she was "crude" and
"unaffectionate."
A male-dominated power structure in the workplace causes men
to see its own members (men) as right and the others (women) as
wrong. As a consequence, the men take sexual harassment com-
plaints less seriously because they come from women. The com-
plaining party becomes the focus of attention ("what did she do
wrong?") rather than the misconduct of which she complains.
An atmosphere of pervasive sexuality in the workplace harms
women's status. "[S]tudies show that the tolerance of nonprofes-
sional conduct [such as profanity and sexual joking] promotes the
stereotyping of women in terms of their sex object status. ' 95 With
the aid of this expert testimony, the court in Robinson v. Jackson-
ville Shipyards, Inc. concluded that the reasonable woman differs
from the reasonable man. A workplace characterized by pornogra-
phy and sexual speech impairs women's job opportunities, but sex
in the workplace has almost no affect on men.
The sexualization of the workplace imposes burdens on women
that are not borne by men. Women must constantly monitor
their behavior to determine whether they are eliciting sexual at-
tention. They must conform their behavior to the existence of
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1503-04.
94. Id. at 1502-03.
95. Id. at 1504.
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the sexual stereotyping either by becoming sexy and responsive to
the men who flirt with them or by becoming rigid, standoffish,
and distant so as to make it clear that they are not interested in
the status of sex object.96
The reasonable woman standard, if broadly adopted, promises to
challenge attitudes and behaviors that have previously been so-
cially acceptable, if impolite. This standard will address women's
experiences and women's needs.
An organization that receives an internal complaint of sexual
harassment should adopt the reasonable woman standard as a pre-
ventive measure in determining whether or not sexual harassment
occurred. While not all jurisdictions accept the reasonable woman
standard, all adopt some aspect of "reasonableness," with some fo-
cus on a reasonable person in the position of the target,97 who is
usually a woman. For this reason, an institution is well advised to
include women among the decision makers who will determine
whether or not sexual harassment occurred. All decision makers,
whether male or female, should be trained in the widely recognized
differences between men and women in their attitudes toward sex-
ual attention. What has previously been deemed trivial (obsessive
sexual attention)9" or acceptable (sexist posters and slurs)99 is now
quite dangerous.
B. Risks of Consensual Sex
While the gravamen of a sexual harassment charge is that the
sexual attention was unwelcome, it is a mistake to assume that con-
sensual sex, whether truly consensual or apparently consensual,
does not run the risk of resulting in a sexual harassment charge.
There is no such thing as safe sex. Indeed, one expert has testified
that dating relationships between supervisors and subordinates are
never truly consensual."°
96. Id. at 1505.
97. See Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990) (reasonable
person of the same sex as the target); Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d
186, 192-93 (1st Cir. 1990) (reasonable person); Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412,
419 (7th Cir. 1989) (reasonable person objective standard combined with subjective
standard).
98. The EEOC and the trial court considered Ellison's complaints trivial. Ellison,
924 F.2d at 875.
99. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
100. Snider v. Consolidation Coal Co., 973 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1992) (upholding the
court's finding of a Title VII violation based in part on expert testimony, even though the
jury, which did not hear the expert, found for defendants on common law claims; the
harasser testified to consensual sexual encounters with at least nine female subordinates).
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When sexual relations at work are truly consensual, there is no
sexual harassment as long as the relationship remains truly consen-
sual and welcome. The danger lies in the transformation of a sweet
relationship into a sour one: one party terminates the relationship
and the other is angry.'"' If that "other" is a supervisor, any sub-
sequent attempts at sex can constitute sexual harassment for which
the institution may be liable. When a supervisor commits quid pro
quo harassment, the institution is often strictly liable.'0 2 Regard-
less of the identity of the "other," whether supervisor or co-
worker, continued sexual attention can constitute a hostile working
environment. 103
Where a relationship was at one time consensual, the party who
terminated and thus no longer welcomes the relationship has a
clear duty to confront the harasser and explain that further sexual
attention is unwelcome. °0 If the sexual attention continues and
the employer has either imputed or actual knowledge of the situa-
tion, the employer may be liable if it fails to take appropriate reme-
dial action.
The more difficult problem arises when a voluntary relationship
appears to be "welcome" but is not. The target who experiences
performance problems may attribute the problems, including ter-
mination or constructive discharge,0 5 to sexual harassment. It
may well be that an unwelcome relationship (sexual harassment)
caused the performance problems.106 Since a voluntary relation-
ship is not necessarily a welcome one, the employer who had im-
puted or actual knowledge of a voluntary but unwelcome sexual
101. See Underwood v. Washington Post Credit Union, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 952, 955 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1992) (The court upheld a jury verdict against the
harasser for intentional infliction of emotional distress, in part because "[c]ruelty from an
ex-lover is unlike hostility that has some other trigger. Because of the congeries of emo-
tions involved, the ex-lover's actions are far more likely to cause pain and mental
turmoil.").
102. See Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance, Inc., 957 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1992).
103. See, e.g., Intlekofer v. Turnage, 973 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1992).
104. EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, supra note 30.
105. A constructive discharge occurs when an employer makes the workplace so in-
tolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign. The constructive dis-
charge, unlike a truly voluntary resignation, subjects the employer to continuing liability
for lost wages. Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co., 977 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1992) (inade-
quate response to complaints of harassment led to a finding of constructive discharge).
Compare Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1992) (mere hostile work-
ing environment will not support constructive discharge claim; greater severity or perva-
siveness is required), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 1250 (Feb. 22, 1993) (No. 92-757). Some
jurisdictions require that the employer must have intended to force the resignation. See
generally LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 30, at 261-62.
106. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
[Vol. 2
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relationship may be liable for sexual harassment if it fails to take
appropriate remedial action.
While the employer may have no duty to monitor sexual rela-
tions in the workplace," 7 the potential liability for apparently con-
sensual relationships requires a sexual harassment policy that is
clear in what it prohibits and user friendly in its reporting proce-
dure. Any target engaged in a voluntary but unwelcome sexual
relationship must know that the employer will provide protection
when the target reports the situation. In addition, it may be wise
for an employer who has knowledge of a sexual relationship at
work, particularly one between a supervisor and subordinate, to
reissue the sexual harassment policy to the parties involved and
perhaps meet with parties to restate the policy orally. This ap-
proach enables the employer to avoid invasion of privacy issues
and finesses the issue of nondating policies, which are difficult to
enforce and may themselves cause problems with employee mo-
rale.10 8 The reissuance of the sexual harassment policy and the
meeting should be documented in preparation for a potential sex-
ual harassment charge. The purpose of these steps is to emphasize
to the parties involved in a seemingly welcome relationship that the
employer will not tolerate an unwelcome sexual relationship and
will protect a victim of such a relationship by prompt corrective
action designed to end the harassment. Of course, the employer
will also reduce the risk of a sexual harassment charge.
C. The Silent Target: When Failure To Complain
Creates Liability
Failure to complain does not mean that sexual harassment is not
occurring and does not constitute a complete bar to a lawsuit. 109
Thanks to expert testimony, courts have begun to recognize that
many women engage in coping strategies rather than complain
about the sexual harassment. These coping strategies are seen as a
consequence of sexual harassment, not as an excuse for it or a de-
fense to it. Indeed, courts recognize that sexual harassment is no-
107. Jackson v. Kimel, 992 F.2d 1318, 1323 (4th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e do not believe
that employers have a duty to investigate every office romance occurring outside the work
place to insure that coercion is not a factor. Something more than mere knowledge by
AT&T of the affair itself must be shown in order to establish ratification under respon-
deat superior principles .... ").
108. See Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 796 F. Supp. 1132 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
109. Meritor, 477 U.S. 57 (failure to complain is no defense where sexual harassment
policy discouraged claims; the policy was not explicit and it required the target to com-
plain to the harasser).
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toriously underreported." 10
Coping methods commonly employed by women experiencing
sexual harassment include: (1) denial ("there's no harassment
here"); (2) avoidance (taking sick leave); (3) compliance (engaging
in similar banter or conduct);' 1 (4) confrontation ("stop this");
and (5) formal complaint.1 12 Of these options, the formal com-
plaint is least likely because women are embarrassed, they fear
blame and retaliation, and they believe that their complaints will
be ignored or, worse, that a complaint will aggravate the
problem.' 1 3
Because of the impediments to reporting harassment, "[a]n effec-
tive policy for controlling sexual harassment cannot rely on ad hoc
incident-by-incident reporting and investigation." 1 4 The employer
must be aware of what is occurring in the workplace. Often the
writing is on the wall (in the form of offensive posters or hostile
graffiti) or the harassment is so pervasive that management will be
deemed to know it exists. 1 5 Because the employer may be held
liable for the sexual harassment of the silent target, the employer
110. See Snider v. Consolidated Coal Co., 973 F.2d 555, 558 (7th Cir. 1992) (expert
testified that over ninety-five percent of victims do not complain because of fear of repri-
sal or loss of privacy); Reynolds v. Borough of Avalon, 799 F. Supp. 442 (D.N.J. 1992).
Compare Komaromy et al., supra note 3 (fewer than one quarter of medical students
sexually harassed in their university training programs reported the incidents, citing a
fear of retaliation, embarrassment, and concern that their complaints would be ignored as
the reasons for not reporting); Cavallo, supra note 4 (in the community hospital survey,
none reported harassment).
However, there has been an increase in claims following the Anita Hill-Clarence
Thomas hearings in October of 1991 and the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Amend-
ments, which encourage targets to bring claims of sex discrimination by allowing for jury
trials and by providing for compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional
discrimination. A plaintiff who establishes a prima facie case of sexual harassment is
entitled to a presumption that the defendant intended to discriminate. Canada v. Boyd
Group, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 771 (D. Nev. 1992). Between October 1 and December 31,
1991, the EEOC experienced a forty-one percent increase in sexual harassment claims
compared to the same period one year earlier. 52 DAILY LABOR REPORT A-12 (March
17, 1992).
111. Compliance with sexual harassment is often seen as a coping strategy rather
than as consent to the harassment. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F.
Supp. 1486, 1506 (M.D. Fla. 1991), appeal docketed, No. 91-3655 (1 1th Cir., argued Dec.
2, 1992).
112. Stockett v. Tolin, 791 F. Supp. 1536, 1549 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (clinical psychologist
testified that targets frequently tolerate sexual harassment because the harassment itself
causes a helplessness that results in "the inability to develop strategies for handling the
[mis]treatment").
113. In Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1498-1501, after the plaintiff complained, the plain-
tiff's co-workers posted more pornographic material and directed increasingly explicit
jokes and graffiti toward the plaintiff and her work area.
114. Id. at 1506.
115. Id. at 1529-31.
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should train its workforce: supervisors should know that they are
obligated to prevent, report, and remedy sexual harassment," I6 and
employees, including supervisors, must understand that their fail-
ure to abide by the company's sexual harassment policy may result
in dismissal and may subject them individually to a lawsuit by the
target or by the employer."' Supervisors should be evaluated on
the basis of their compliance with the institution's sexual harass-
ment policy.
A well-designed sexual harassment policy may insulate an em-
ployer from claims by a silent target. However, such protection is
available only if the sexual harassment policy is truly user-friendly
and if the harassment is not otherwise obvious. A harassed em-
ployee has no duty to report obvious harassment, but when the
harassment is not obvious, the target's failure to complain in the
face of a well-designed complaint procedure should insulate the
employer from liability. An employer with an effective complaint
procedure can legitimately argue that had the target complained,
the employer would have provided protection. Moreover, in such
circumstances, failure to complain may reflect on the target's
credibility. " 18
116. Id. at 1527.
117. Although a recent case, Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir.
1993), held that there can be no individual liability under either Title VII or the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988), other decisions have held
supervisors individually liable when acting as an agent of the employer or when commit-
ting sexual harassment. Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987); Harvey v.
Blake, 913 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1990) (supervisor liable under Title VII as employer's agent
only in his or her official capacity); Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554
(1 th Cir. 1987); Canada v. Boyd Group, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 771 (D. Nev. 1992) (individ-
uals not liable for compensatory damages under the 1991 Civil Rights Amendments);
Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 772 F. Supp. 407, 411 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (supervisor act-
ing as agent was not individually liable under Title VII, but supervisor was liable in
official capacity only so as to bind employer); Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1533 n. 11 (while
liability attaches to the supervisor individually, only the employer can be held responsible
for relief in the form of backpay). But see Otto v. Department of Health & Human
Servs., 781 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1986) (supervisor held independently liable for state tort
claims of defamation and invasion of privacy arising out of sexual harassment); Murphy
v. Chicago Transit Auth., 638 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (supervisors liable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to sexual harassment by co-workers); Biggs v.
Surrey Broadcasting Co., 811 P.2d 111 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991) (employer, who settled a
sexual harassment claim for $65,000 and subsequently sued the harasser for indemnifica-
tion, could be indemnified by the harasser if the employer showed that the settlement was
reasonable, and if the harasser could not show employer fault).
118. EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, supra note 30. ("Where there is
some indication of welcomeness or when the credibility of the parties is at issue, the ...
claim will be considerably strengthened if [the target] made a contemporaneous com-
plaint or protest.").
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V. PREVENTIVE STEPS: THE EFFECTIVE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT POLICY
The law under Title VII allows an employer to limit substan-
tially sexual harassment liability if the employer does the follow-
ing: (1) implements a written sexual harassment policy that
encourages meritorious claims; (2) promptly and effectively investi-
gates all claims or "known" instances of sexual harassment;" 9 (3)
takes appropriate corrective action designed to end harassment
(when it is found);120 and (4) monitors corrective action to ensure
that harassment has stopped and does not recur.2'
The investigation must be thorough, extensive, and conducted in
good faith;1 22 it should consider whether the number and types of
complaints indicate a systemic problem; and, if the workplace is
male-dominated, the employer may have "an increased obligation
to create environments which are safe for all employees." 23
Appropriate corrective action may range from counselling to
termination. In no event should the target be disadvantaged by the
corrective action; a transfer or change in job duties should not be
implemented without the target's consent. The target should not
119. An employer should not respond to complaints with (1) unfulfilled promises of
investigation, (2) demotion, (3) advice that a slander suit could follow, or (4) an observa-
tion that harassment is like a pink elephant and can vanish with the snap of a finger.
These actions sustained a claim for constructive discharge as a result of sexual harass-
ment in Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co., 977 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1992). Other ill-advised
responses include "lighten up, develop a thicker skin," "carry a knife," Hansel v. Public
Servs. Co., 778 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Colo. 1991); "tell him you have herpes," Brooms v.
Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989); and "don't go to the EEOC," Yates v.
Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987).
120. Davis v. Tri-State Mack Distribs., 981 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1992) (response
neither prompt nor adequate when no action was taken on first complaint and attempted
corrective action was merely a request for an apology); Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Auto-
lite Div., 970 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1992) (company's prompt and adequate response to
supervisor's harassment insulated company from liability).
121. Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1990) (reprimand and
denial of promotion and merit raise to foreman who publicly forced plaintiff's face into
his crotch was appropriate discipline because foreman was responsive to discipline and
conduct did not recur).
122. Such an investigation conducted prior to disciplinary action should minimize
claims for wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See John-
son v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1651
(D.S.D. 1986).
123. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1252 (D.
Minn. 1993) (The employer lost this class action suit for hostile working environment
because of its inadequate responses to claims of sexual harassment: it "did not create a
system for handling complaints, it did not attempt to identify or discipline the employees
responsible for the sexually explicit materials, and it did not communicate to male em-
ployees the need to show respect for females.").
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be punished for making the charge, even if an internal investigation
results in a conclusion that no harassment occurred. When com-
plainants are punished for complaining, the sexual harassment pol-
icy is not sincere and indeed is interpreted as a warning to all
victims that they complain at their own peril.1 24
Implementing the right kind of sexual harassment policy should
absolve an employer of corporate liability, at least for claims of
hostile working environment: the employer will learn of sexual
harassment that is otherwise undisclosed and take appropriate cor-
rective action. If the employer has an effective harassment policy
in place but an employee does not complain, the employer can ar-
gue that knowledge of the harassment cannot be imputed to the
employer. When a good policy is in effect, the obligation to bring
private harassment to light should be on the target. If the target
does not complain, the corporation should not be held liable,
though the harasser may be. Where the harassment is obvious,
however, the employer cannot insist upon a complaint. Since
many courts impose automatic liability for quid quo pro harass-
ment, the employer must control its supervisors to ensure against
corporate liability for this harassment.
An effective sexual harassment policy is one that encourages
meritorious claims and responds with appropriate corrective and
preventive action. When the employer has determined that harass-
ment occurred, it must, at a minimum, express strong disapproval
of the conduct, reprimand the harasser, and inform the harasser
that repeated harassment can result in termination. 25 The em-
ployer must determine what impact any corrective action short of
discharge will have on the complaining party. 126 When the harass-
ment is mild and the harasser is cooperative and contrite, counsel-
ling may be appropriate. But where the harassment is severe or the
harasser appears recalcitrant, discharge may be required.
An employer taking a preventive approach to sexual harassment
should take the following steps:1 27
124. An employer should think very carefully before terminating an employee who
makes a false claim of harassment. The proof of falsehood and malice should be clear.
The accused may sue the untruthful employee for defamation. The Illinois Human
Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/1-102 (1992), states that public policy includes preventing un-
founded charges of harassment. The employer may use this or other similar policy state-
ments when confronting a patently false claim.
125. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
126. Id.
127. The Appendix to this article contains an excellent model policy that can be
adapted to the healthcare setting. It was drafted by the Women's Bar Association of
Illinois. Other excellent model policies can be found in ABA COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE
1993]
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Commit to, widely disseminate, and implement an effec-
tive written policy designed to encourage meritorious
complaints.
Clearly describe sexual harassment using simple, direct,
and specific language.
Provide an illustrative list of prohibited behaviors, but
state clearly that the list is not exhaustive.
Acknowledge that what the accused may perceive as a
compliment or a joke may be perceived as harassment by
the target. "Unintentional" conduct that gives offense
should be prohibited.
Explain that sexual harassment can result from the be-
havior of supervisors, co-workers, or subordinates.
Forcefully prohibit sexual harassment.
Emphasize that violations of the policy will result in dis-
cipline, up to and including discharge.
Establish multiple avenues for complaint in order to
guard against the possibility that the target's only recourse
is to report the offensive conduct to the harasser.
Select respected, compassionate, and accessible employ-
ees to receive complaints; include at least one woman. An
"open door" policy to the company president may be intim-
idating and therefore discourage complaints.
Eliminate sexually offensive graffiti, posters, and other
material, and prohibit sexist slurs. Take immediate action
when potentially harassing situations are observed; do not
wait for a complaint when the harassment is obvious.
Assure employees that complaints will not result in repri-
sal or retaliation. Do not try to eradicate the harassment by
taking action adverse to the claimant; such action could
subject the employer to a charge of retaliation under Title
VII.
State that all complaints will be promptly investigated in
an appropriate manner and ensure that this is done.
Devise appropriate and objective investigative tech-
niques. Obtain the who-what-when-where information, as
well as a list of witnesses and names of people, such as
PROFESSION, LAWYERS AND BALANCED LIVES: A GUIDE TO DRAFTING AND IMPLE-
MENTING WORKPLACE POLICIES FOR LAWYERS (1990) and ABA SECTION OF LITIGA-
TION, THE WOMAN ADVOCATE (1993). A more succinct model policy can be found in
LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 30, at 722.
[Vol. 2
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friends, relatives, and co-workers, to whom the target con-
temporaneously reported the harassment.
Maintain all records of the complaint, investigation, and
determination in a separate, locked file.
Assure that confidentiality will be protected to the extent
possible, with information divulged only on a "need to
know" basis. However, do not promise unqualified confi-
dentiality: employers cannot provide complete confidential-
ity and at the same time conduct an appropriate
investigation. A complaint charges the employer with
knowledge of potential harassment. Hence, the employer
must conduct an investigation that will protect not only the
complaining party but silent or future targets as well. This
is true even if the complaining party insists that the em-
ployer take no action. If this happens, try to determine why
the complaining party is taking this position. Is it because
of a fear of retaliation?
Respect the rights of all parties involved in an investiga-
tion, and remain objective and fair.
Insist that all employees, whether the complaining party,
the accused, witnesses, or other interviewees, have an obli-
gation to cooperate in the investigation and to keep all in-
formation confidential. Assure that there will be no
reprisals for cooperating in the investigation. Impose sanc-
tions for noncompliance with this company policy.
Explain that after an appropriate and thorough investiga-
tion, the employer will make a reasonable and good faith
determination of whether harassment occurred.
Emphasize that any harasser will be appropriately disci-
plined, up to and including discharge; impose discipline
that will prevent any recurrence of the harassment.
Note that any corrective action will be subject to follow-
up to ensure that the harassment has ended and will not
recur.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the law that applies to sexual harassment in the workplace
has developed, all will benefit from its noble ends: employees will
be evaluated on the basis of performance, members of the work-
place will behave in a respectful, business-like manner, and produc-
tivity will be enhanced. Healthcare attorneys may face unique
challenges given the hierarchial structure of the healthcare envi-
19931
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ronment, the number of independent contractors working in the
area, the frequent existence of a teacher-student relationship, and
the preference for self-regulation.
However, the law encourages a preventive approach to sexual
harassment. The implementation of an effective sexual harassment
policy, as described in this article, is an important step toward pro-
tecting the legitimate interests of all parties involved.
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APPENDIX
SAMPLE SEXUAL HARASSMENT POLICY*
I. STATEMENT OF POLICY
(hereinafter referred to as "the Firm") is
committed to maintaining a work environment that encourages
and fosters appropriate conduct among employees and respect for
individual values and sensibilities. Accordingly, the (Firm Name)
intends to enforce its Sexual Harassment Policy at all levels within
the work place in order to create an environment free from dis-
crimination of any kind, including sexual harassment.
Sexual harassment, according to the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission and the Illinois Department of Human Rights,
and for purposes of this policy, consists of unwelcome sexual ad-
vances, requests for sexual favors, other verbal, non-verbal, or
physical acts of a sexual or sex-based nature, where
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or im-
plicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment; or(2) an employment decision affecting an employee is based on
that individual's acceptance or rejection of such conduct; or
(3) such conduct interferes with an individual's work perform-
ance or creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive working
environment.
Sexual harassment can occur between men and women, or mem-
bers of the same gender. This behavior is unacceptable in the work
place itself and in other work-related settings such as business
trips, court appearances and business-related social events.
It is also unlawful to retaliate in any way against anyone who
has complained about sexual harassment or discrimination,
whether that concern relates to harassment of or discrimination
against the individual raising the concern or against another
individual.
Sexual harassment affects the victim and other employees as
well. Each incident of harassment contributes to a general atmos-
* Copyright, Women's Bar Association of Illinois; August, 1993. (This Sample
Policy was developed as a result of the WBAI's Employment Law Committee's review of
the EEOC Guidelines; the Illinois Human Rights Act and related regulations; several
model policies from actual employers, including law firms; and the ABA's Commission
on Women in the Profession's Sample Policy, from which some terrific language
pertaining to cetain areas was adapted or outright lifted. In addition, comments were
solicited from organizations having or expressing an interest in contributing to the
development of a model policy. The draft should be considered as an evolving document
subject to modification as input is received from WBAI members and other sources.)
1993]
29
Cooper: Sexual Harassment: Preventive Steps for the Healthcare Practition
Published by LAW eCommons, 1993
Annals of Health Law
phere in which everyone suffers the consequences. Sexually-
oriented acts or sex-based conduct have no legitimate business pur-
pose. Where such conduct is directed by a supervisor (or someone
in a management position) toward a subordinate, the former will
be held to a higher standard of accountability because of the degree
of control and influence he or she has or is perceived to have over
the employment conditions and benefits of the subordinate.
II. PROHIBITED CONDUCT
Prohibited acts of sexual harassment can take a variety of forms
ranging from subtle pressure for sexual activity or contact to physi-
cal contact. At times the offender may be unaware that his or her
conduct is offensive or harassing to others. Examples of conduct
which could be considered sexual harassment include:
(a) persistent or repeated unwelcome flirting, pressure for dates,
sexual comments or touching;
(b) sexually suggestive jokes, gestures or sounds directed toward
another or sexually oriented or degrading comments about
another;
(c) preferential treatment of an employee, or a promise of prefer-
ential treatment to an employee, in exchange for dates or sex-
ual conduct; or the denial or threat of denial of employment,
benefits or advancement for refusal to consent to sexual
advances;
(d) the open display of sexually oriented pictures, posters, or
other material offensive to others;
(e) retaliation against an individual for reporting or complaining
about sexually harassing conduct.
III. INDIVIDUALS COVERED UNDER THE POLICY
This policy covers all employees (associates, paralegals, support
staff) and partners. The Firm will not tolerate, condone or allow
sexual harassment, whether engaged in by fellow employees, super-
visors, associates, partners or by outside clients, opposing counsel,
court personnel or other non-employees who conduct business
with this Firm. The Firm supports and encourages reporting of all
incidents of sexual harassment, regardless of who the offender may
be, and will promptly investigate all reported incidents. Where the
alleged offender is not an employee or partner of the Firm, the
Firm's management, in consultation with the complainant, will re-
view the complaint and make every effort to identify a reasonable
remedy if sexual harassment has been confirmed.
[Vol. 2
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IV. COMPLAINT PROCESS
While the Firm encourages individuals who believe they are be-
ing harassed to firmly and promptly notify the offender that his or
her behavior is unwelcome, the Firm also recognizes that power
and status disparities between an alleged harasser and a target may
make such a confrontation impossible. In the event that such in-
formal, direct communication between individuals is either ineffec-
tive or impossible, or even when such communication has occured,
the following steps should be taken to report a sexual harassment
complaint.
A. Reporting of Incident: All employees are urged to report
any suspected sexual harassment by another employee to the
(Personnel Director; or Office Manager;
or Senior Partner; or, where firm size and resources permit,
to a member of a Committee created to handle complaints),
except where that person is the individual accused of harass-
ment. In that case, the complaint should be reported to
• If the victim prefers to report the
suspected harassment to someone of the opposite gender
from that of the , the complaint can be
reported to . The report may be made
initially either orally or in writing, but reports made orally
must be reduced to writing before an investigation can be
initiated and a resolution achieved.
B. Investigation of Complaint: When a complaint has been re-
duced to writing, the or the individual
informed pursuant to Paragraph A above will initiate an in-
vestigation of the suspected sexual harassment within five (5)
working days of notification. If necessary, the Firm repre-
sentative receiving the complaint may designate another su-
pervisory or management employee of the opposite sex to
assist him/her in the investigation. If any of said individuals
is the subject of the investigation, the investigation will be
conducted by the . The investigation will
include an interview with the employee(s) who made the ini-
tial report, the person(s) towards whom the suspected har-
assment was directed and the individual(s) accused of the
harassment. Any other person who may have information
regarding the alleged sexual harassment may also be
interviewed.
C. Report: The person responsible for investigating the com-
plaint shall prepare a written report within ten (10) working
days of his/her notification of the suspected harassment un-
less extenuating circumstances prevent him/her from doing
so. The report shall include a finding that sexual harassment
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occurred, sexual harassment did not occur, or there is incon-
clusive evidence as to whether sexual harassment occurred.
A copy of the report will be given to the employee(s) who
made the initial report, the employee(s) to whom the sus-
pected harassment was directed, and the individual(s) ac-
cused of the harassment.
D. Records; Confidentiality: Employees who report incidents of
sexual harassment are encouraged to keep written notes in
order to accurately record the offensive conduct. Every ef-
fort shall be made to keep all matter related to the investiga-
tion and various reports confidential. In the event of a
lawsuit, however, the Firm advises that records it maintains
and the complainant maintains may not be considered privi-
leged from disclosure. Written records will be maintained
for __ years from the date of the resolution unless new
circumstances dictate that the file should be kept for a
longer period of time.
E. Timeframe for Reporting Complaint: The Firm encourages a
prompt reporting of complaints so that rapid response and
appropriate action may be taken. However, due to the sensi-
tivity of these problems and because of the emotional toll
such misconduct may have on the individual, no limited
timeframe will be instituted for reporting sexual harassment
complaints. Delayed reporting of complaints will not in and
of itself preclude this Firm from taking remedial action.
F. Protection Against Retaliation: The Firm will not in any way
retaliate against an individual who makes a report of sexual
harassment nor permit any partner or employee to do so.
Retaliation is a serious violation of this sexual harassment
policy and should be reported immediately. Any person
found to have retaliated against another individual for re-
porting sexual harassment will be subject to the same disci-
plinary action provided for sexual harassment offenders.
G. Appeals Process: If either party directly involved in a sexual
harassment investigation is dissatisfied with the outcome or
resolution, that individual has the right to appeal the deci-
sion. The dissatisfied party should submit his/her written
comments in a timely manner to (select the
appropriate reviewers; individual or group of individuals,
e.g., Administrative Partners of the Firm).
V. DISCIPLINE/SANCTIONS
Disciplinary action will be taken against any employee found to
have engaged in sexual harassment of any other employee. The
extent of sanctions may depend in part upon the length and condi-
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tions of employment of the particular employee and the nature of
the offense. The Firm has the right to apply any sanction or com-
bination of sanctions, up to and including termination, to deal with
unreasonable conduct or discrimination.
Where a hostile work environment has been found to exist the
Firm will take all reasonable steps to eliminate the conduct creat-
ing such an environment.
If an investigation results in a finding that the complainant
falsely accused another of sexual harassment knowingly or in a ma-
licious manner, the complainant will be subject to appropriate
sanctions, including the possibility of termination.
NOTE: This policy is not intended as a contractual obligation.
The Firm reserves the right to amend the policy from time to time.
THE FIRM
DATED: BY:
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